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Abstract—Since Grid computing systems involve large-scale re-
source sharing, resource management is central to their opera-
tions. Whereas there are more Grid resource management systems
adopting auction, commodity market, and contract-net (tendering)
models, this survey supplements and complements existing sur-
veys by reviewing, comparing, and highlighting existing research
initiatives on applying bargaining (negotiation) as a mechanism to
Grid resource management. The contributions of this paper are: 1)
discussing the motivations for considering bargaining models for
Grid resource allocation; 2) discussing essential design considera-
tions such as modeling devaluation of Grid resources, considering
market dynamics, relaxing bargaining terms, and co-allocation of
resources when building Grid negotiation mechanisms; 3) review-
ing the strategies and protocols of state-of-the-art Grid negotiation
mechanisms; 4) providing detailed comparisons and analyses on
how state-of-the-art Grid negotiation mechanisms address the de-
sign considerations mentioned in 3); and 5) suggesting possible new
directions.
Index Terms—Automated negotiation, bargaining, computa-
tional economy, G-commerce, Grid economics, Grid resource allo-
cation, Grid resource management, negotiation agent.
I. INTRODUCTION
S INCE a computational Grid [1], [2] focuses on large-scaleresource sharing, resource management is central to its
operations [3, p. 135]. However, providing efficient resource al-
location mechanisms in the Grid is a complex undertaking due
to its scale and the fact that resource owners and consumers
may have different goals, policies, and preferences. A Grid is
a very large-scale network computing system that can poten-
tially scale to Internet size, and the network computing system
can be viewed as a virtual computer consisting of a networked
set of heterogeneous machines (owned by multiple organiza-
tions) that agree to share their local resources with each other
[3, p. 135]. Computing resources required by an application to
execute tasks may be owned by other organizations, and re-
source owners and consumers often have different objectives,
preferences, and policies. To this end, Grid applications gener-
ally do not have complete control over the resources that they
need to execute their tasks. With resource owners and consumers
having different management policies, access models and cost
models, it may be difficult to implement the mechanisms and
policies needed for effective use of shared resources.
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In a position paper by Sim [4], it was argued that software
agents (or automatic scheduling programs), in particular, nego-
tiation agents, can play an essential role in realizing the Grid
vision. Numerous economic models for Grid resource man-
agement such as commodity market models, auction, contract-
net/tendering models, bargaining models, posted price mod-
els, bid-based proportional resource sharing models, coopera-
tive bartering models, and monopoly and oligopoly had been
proposed in the literature and were summarized in [5] and [6].
Whereas some of the more commonly referenced work (e.g.,
see [7]–[10]) focused on commodity markets, auction, and
contract-net/tendering models for Grid resource management,
this paper focuses on reviewing and comparing bargaining (ne-
gotiation) models for Grid resource management. The intention
of this paper is to supplement and complement the existing
survey papers on Grid resource management [3], [5], [6] by
reviewing and highlighting existing research initiatives on ap-
plying automated negotiation as a mechanism to Grid resource
management. The contributions of this paper are listed as fol-
lows. Whereas Section II provides the motivations for consid-
ering automated negotiation as a model for allocating Grid re-
sources, Section III discusses the challenges of the bargaining
problem in Grid resource management and identifies some is-
sues for consideration when building negotiation mechanisms
for Grid resource management. Section IV reviews some state-
of-the-art bargaining models for Grid resource management.
Section V provides detailed comparisons and analyses of the
strategies and protocols of the bargaining mechanisms discussed
in Section IV. Sections VI and VII summarize and conclude this
paper by discussing new directions and open problems.
II. GRID RESOURCE NEGOTIATION
Whereas the arrival of e-commerce blurred the difference be-
tween negotiations and auctions, Kersten et al. [11] and Bichler
et al. [12] outlined some of their major differences. Negotiation
is a form of decision making with two or more actively involved
agents who cannot make decisions independently (or achieve
their goals unilaterally), and therefore must make concessions
to achieve a compromise [13]. On the other hand, an auction is
a market institution with an explicit set of rules determining re-
source allocation and prices on the basis of bids from the market
agents [14]. It was noted in [11, p. 10] that while auction-like
protocols play a major role when determination of value is the
primary concern, negotiation-like protocols may be more ap-
propriate when participants are not only concerned with deter-
mining value, but also other factors, e.g., inter-business relation-
ships (see Section IV-B) and success rates (see Section IV-D). In
situations involving inter-business relationships, an integrative
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negotiation mechanism (which finds solutions to reconcile the
interests of all agents) may be more appropriate than auctions,
because “auctions focus on determining the value of objects
of unknown value while negotiations are about cooperating to
create value” [11, p. 6]. Section IV-A describes an example of
a G-negotiation mechanism that has an integrative negotiation
phase for improving the joint outcome of all agents. Moreover,
in a Grid computing environment, being more successful in ac-
quiring computing resources is essential (see Section III). To
this end, it seems more prudent to adopt negotiation mecha-
nisms for successfully reconciling the differences between re-
source providers and consumers rather than using auctions for
purely determining the value of resources. Section IV-D de-
scribes a G-negotiation mechanism that not only strives to op-
timize agents’ utilities, but also their negotiation success rates.
However, it is not the intention of this paper to debate the dif-
ferences/similarities and advantages/disadvantages between ne-
gotiations and auctions. These issues are already debated quite
considerably in [11]. Rather, this section discusses some motiva-
tions for considering Grid resource negotiation mechanisms as
follows. In [15, p. 231], it was noted that prices and negotiations
can be used to coordinate the activities of objects and software
entities. In a Grid setting, negotiation among Grid applications
and Grid resource providers is necessary because:
1) there is a need to obtain contracts and commitments for
provisioning resources/services;
2) there is a need to resolve differences between Grid appli-
cations and resource providers;
3) through negotiation, resource providers are given the op-
portunity to maximize their return-on-investment and con-
sumers to minimize the price they pay for utilizing Grid
resources.
1) Obtaining Contracts/Commitments: To execute a task, a
Grid application may need resources that are owned by other
organization(s), possibly spanning multiple administrative do-
mains [16, p. 632]. This is because: 1) computationally (or data)
intensive applications may require more resource(s) than a sin-
gle computing machine (e.g., a workstation, a supercomputer,
or a cluster of computers) can provide in one administrative
domain [5, p. 1]; or 2) an application may require a type or
several types of computing capability (that it does not have)
from resource owner(s) in other administrative domain(s). Con-
sequently, it cannot be assumed that a resource provider will
unconditionally provide a (computing) capability to a consumer
[17, pp. 12–13]. Hence, it is necessary for an application to ob-
tain commitments or contracts from a resource owner to provide
a service/resource [17, pp. 12–13]. To ensure that the necessary
capabilities will be available when required, it is essential for
automatic scheduling programs (or software agents) of a Grid
application to have the ability to negotiate an agreement for a
specific time [16, p. 633].
2) Resolving Differences: Since Grid participants are in-
dependent bodies, with different access policies, objectives,
requirements, and supply-and-demand patterns, negotiation is
needed to resolve their differences. For instance, even if a re-
source owner (perhaps, from a different administrative domain)
is willing to provide a service or to lease a computing resource to
a Grid application, one would still be faced with the question of
determining the desired level of service and the cost of provid-
ing the service because resource owners set their own policies
and cost [18, p. 2]. Hence, a Grid resource management system
should support negotiation between consumers and providers.
Whereas consumers require assurance on the level, type, and
quality of service (e.g., timeliness [19, p. 104]) being provided
by the resources, resource owners are concerned about main-
taining local control on how resources are being utilized (the
usage policy).
3) Optimizing Utility: Through bargaining, both resource
providers and consumers can initiate resource trading and par-
ticipate in the trading process depending on their requirements
and objectives. Whereas consumers select resource providers
that offer the lowest service costs and also meet their dead-
line and budget requirements, resource providers offer services
to the resource consumer with the highest bid as long as the
consumer’s objectives can be met. Both resource providers and
consumers have their own utility functions that must be satisfied
and maximized [6, p. 1514]. In a bargaining model, this may in-
volve devising a competitive negotiation strategy for optimizing
the utility of self-interested agents in a distributive negotiation
environment [20], and/or strategies for agents to search for joint
gains in an integrative negotiation environment [20].
III. ISSUES IN DESIGNING GRID NEGOTIATION MECHANISMS
The bargaining problem in Grid resource management is dif-
ficult because while attempting to optimize utility, negotiation
agents need to: 1) model devaluation of Grid resources with
time; 2) consider the (market) dynamics of a computational
Grid; 3) be highly successful in acquiring resources to reduce
delay overhead in waiting for resources; and 4) negotiate for
simultaneous access to multiple resources (sometimes spanning
different administrative domains).
1) Modeling Devaluation of Resources: Grid resources are
perishable in the sense that “computing capacities not used now
is worthless in the next moment” [21, p. 3]. Time discounting
is the standard way for modeling devaluation of goods over
time due to perishing [22, p. 715]. As noted by Binmore and
Basgupta (see [23, p. 14]): “The passage of time has a cost in
terms of both dollars and the sacrifice of utility which stems
from the postponement of consumption, and it will be precisely
this cost which motivates the whole bargaining process. If it did
not matter when the parties agreed, it would not matter whether
they agreed at all.” For Grid resources, time discounting is also
essential for modeling losing utility (e.g., decreasing value of a
resource) with time as a result of a resource not being leased out
and utilized. Hence, Grid resource management systems should
model the devaluation of Grid resources with time.
2) Considering Market Dynamics: Like conventional re-
sources (e.g., electricity and gasoline), computing resources in
a Grid also have dynamic values. The value of Grid resources
is derived from a combination of need and scarcity [21, p. 2].
Grid consumers’ demand for resources does not remain con-
stant but changes with time. For instance, during a project life
cycle, users may have varying workloads and number of tasks in
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different project stages. Intuitively, when computing resources
are scarce, variation in consumers’ demand affects the value of
resources. Furthermore, resources and services are constantly
being added or removed from the Grid [24], [25]. Hence, it is
essential to take market dynamics into consideration because: 1)
the value of resources varies with changing consumers’ demand,
and consumers can enter/withdraw requests, perhaps at machine
speed; and 2) resource capacities vary as providers can make
resources/services available to and disconnect from a Grid.
The use of market mechanisms helps regulate supply and de-
mand of resources [5, p. 2]. The use of currency offers incentives
for resource providers to contribute resources and Grid applica-
tions should be more prudent when using resources given that
budget is limited and resources are scarce. Hence, using a market
mechanism may reduce the likelihood that applications become
wasteful in using limited computing resources [26, p. 8]. Addi-
tionally, a resource management system needs to continuously
adapt to changes in: 1) the availability of computing resources
(e.g., due to providers leaving the Grid or more consumers join-
ing the Grid); and 2) requirements of applications (e.g., due to
more job requests from consumers) [5, p. 2].
3) Relaxing Bargaining Criteria: A resource management
system should consider resource availability and application
QoS requirements (e.g., timeliness [19, p. 104]). G-negotiation
agents should be designed to consider the tradeoff between the
benefit of using a suboptimal (or slightly more expensive) re-
source that can be located and allocated more quickly and the
benefit of using the best (or least expensive) resource, which may
be more difficult to acquire. For instance, to acquire resources
more rapidly, they should be designed to slightly relax their
bargaining criteria (such as accepting a slightly higher price),
especially when the Grid loading is very high (i.e., many com-
puting resources are occupied). It was noted in [27, p. 113] that
when the QoS requirements of an application cannot be fully
met, one of the options is using an alternative implementation.
Like time constraint, this consideration relates to the issue of the
speed at which resources can be allocated, which, in turn, relates
to the issue of overhead [9]. Furthermore, it was noted in [26]
that resource management systems should take both economic
and computational factors into consideration. Echoing [26], this
work takes the stance that the desire for more resources (or to
acquire less expensive resources) should be balanced by an at-
tention to more traditional system metrics (e.g., computational
efficiency).
4) Resource Co-Allocation: A Grid resource management
system should bolster co-allocation of computing (or data) re-
sources [18, p. 2]. In Grid computing, the problem of resource
co-allocation is allocating to an application multiple resources
belonging to different administrative domains. To coordinate the
utilization of multiple resources owned by different administra-
tive domains, advance reservation of resources that specifies the
time and duration of a resource capacity is essential [16, p. 3].
Unlike generic e-commerce negotiations where a buyer-seller
pair negotiates for a product or a service, perhaps in a sin-
gle negotiation phase, a Grid application may need to engage
in a multiphase negotiation process with resource owners, to
reserve, acquire, coordinate, schedule, and potentially renego-
tiate resource access. Whereas common bargaining protocols
such as the alternating offers protocol [28, p. 100] will suffice
for most generic e-commerce negotiations, dealing with nego-
tiation of resource co-allocation and advance resource reser-
vations requires more sophisticated negotiation protocols. One
such protocol is Service Negotiation and Acquisition Protocol
(SNAP)—see Section IV-F.
IV. G-NEGOTIATION MODELS
This section reviews and discusses state-of-the-art approaches
of Grid resource negotiation mechanisms in terms of their strate-
gies and protocols. These include works that:
1) adopt a two-phase bargaining protocol for G-negotiation
(see Section IV-A);
2) use rule sets to express policies for G-negotiation (see
Section IV-B);
3) employ time-dependent and resource-dependent negotia-
tion decision functions (NDFs) for negotiating Grid infor-
mation notification services (see Section IV-C);
4) design market-driven strategies and relaxed-criteria pro-
tocol for G-commerce (see Section IV-D);
5) use a bargaining game to model G-negotiation in mobile
Grids (see Section IV-E);
6) devise negotiation protocols for resource co-allocation and
advance reservation (see Section IV-F).
A. Two-Phase Protocol for G-Negotiation
Lang [29] proposed a multiple-attribute negotiation mecha-
nism for managing the resource usage in a computational Grid
using a Grid carrier agent (GCA) to implement the intermediary
function of matching suppliers’ service capabilities and resource
consumers’ demand profiles (note that in [29], the GCA is uti-
lized to support the connection of services and demands rather
than to enforce the rules of negotiation or interaction). The
goal is to design agents that autonomously negotiate multiple-
attribute Grid service contracts. In [29], the negotiation proto-
col consists of: 1) a distributive negotiation phase, in which
(self-interested) agents adopt heuristic strategies to iteratively
exchange bids (make proposals and counterproposals) among
themselves; and 2) an integrative negotiation phase, in which
agents attempt to find joint gains while trying to maintain the
utility distribution outcomes from the distributive negotiation
phase.
In the distributive negotiation phase, agents attempt to max-
imize utilities by adopting a heuristic strategy that takes into
account knowledge of the user’s goal (e.g., attribute weight),
and knowledge about the market (supply/demand ratio). In [29],
an agent determines the amount of concession by considering
both time-dependent and market factors. With respect to time,
agents in [29] adopt three concession making strategies: ag-
gressive, neutral, and defensive corresponding, respectively, to
the Boulware, Linear, and Conceder NDFs in [30] and [31].
Whereas an agent adopting a Boulware strategy maintains its
bid/offer until almost toward its deadline, an agent adopting a
Conceder strategy rapidly concedes to its reservation value (e.g.,
its reserve price). Additionally, a service agent determines its
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“market power” by taking into account the ratio of: 1) the num-
ber of supply advertisements for the same competing service;
and 2) the total number of advertisements published in the entire
system. In this phase, agents negotiate by alternately exchanging
proposals and counterproposals following the alternating offers
protocol. Moreover, it was noted in [29] that the distributive
phase may generate service allocations that are below Pareto
efficiency since self-interested agents (representing the interests
of different individuals/organizations may not share common
goals) negotiate with incomplete information (e.g., agents lack
information about specific parameters of their opponents, which
are private such as their preferences over the possible outcomes,
and reserve prices [29]). An outcome is Pareto-efficient if there
is no other outcome that improves the outcome for one agent
without making another agent worse off [32]. When an agent
does not know the preference of the other agent, it does not know
which of the possible joint outcomes is Pareto-optimal, and this
may lead to a negotiation outcome that may not necessarily be
best for all agents.
Whereas the distributive phase allows an agent to strive to
optimize its individual outcome, the integrative phase allows
agents to make minor adjustments to the preliminary agree-
ment in the distributive phase in the hope of improving the joint
outcomes of all agents. In the integrative negotiation phase,
agents attempt to search for mutual improvements by exchang-
ing proposals to slightly modify the preliminary agreement (con-
tract) made in the distributive negotiation phase. Agents achieve
this by randomly modifying the preliminary contracts using a
Gaussian distribution such that the probability for making minor
(respectively, major) modification is high (respectively, low) for
each of the attributes. The objective is to find a solution that is
more Pareto-efficient than the preliminary contract in the previ-
ous phase while still preserving the utility gain of each individ-
ual agent as much as possible. Modifications of the preliminary
contract follow a Gaussian (or normal) distribution because this
will preserve as much as possible the utility gain of each indi-
vidual agent obtained in the distributive negotiation phase. The
probability function of a Gaussian distribution follows a normal
curve (or “bell-shaped” curve) with the property that there is a
higher probability of making minor changes (i.e., higher chance
of having smaller deviations from the preliminary contract) and
a lower probability of making more major changes (i.e., lower
chance of having larger deviations from the preliminary con-
tract). Similar to the distributive phase, agents in the integrative
negotiation phase adopt the alternating offers protocol to mod-
ify their contracts (based on their current preliminary contracts)
until no further improvement is found.
B. Policy-Driven G-Negotiation
Policy-driven Automated Negotiation Decision-making Ap-
proach (PANDA) by Gimpel et al. [33] adopts a rule-based
framework for negotiation in service contracts. In PANDA, rule
sets express policies that consider customer satisfaction and
business reputation rather than just maximizing utilities. The
basic building block of a PANDA strategy is a single condition-
action rule, and a strategy is implemented using a set of rules.
For instance, PANDA has rules such as “if the customer’s offer
is close to an agent’s proposal, and if the customer is new, then
accept the offer” to express the policy for giving preference to
new customers. The rules reason on an object pool, comprising
of negotiation history (previous messages exchanged among the
agents), current offer, and estimation programs. The estimation
programs are used to derive parameters such as: 1) desirability
of a new contract; 2) feasibility for a service provider to support
a contract; and 3) probabilistic risk measure. These parameters
provide guidelines for the decision criteria on issues such as how
far a counterproposal should deviate from the opponent’s cur-
rent proposal, and hence, how much concession an agent should
make. An agent in PANDA computes the difference in utilities
between its proposal and the proposal of its opponent based on
attributes such as price, delay, response time, and availability,
and determines a counterproposal using the parameters derived
by the estimation programs.
An example of a rule set in PANDA’s agents is given as
follows:
1) “if LEVEL_OF_DISSENT < 0.05 then ACCEPT;
2) if LEVEL_OF_DISSENT < 0.2 and NEW_CUSTOMER
then ACCEPT;
3) if LEVEL_OF_DISSENT > 0.2 then FIND_TRADE_
OFF_OFFER.”
Here, “LEVEL_OF_DISSENT” refers to the utility differ-
ence between an agent’s proposal and the counterproposal of its
opponent. An interesting feature of PANDA is that the rule set
expresses the policies for negotiation and other aspects such as
business reputation and customer satisfaction rather than just
profitability and maximizing utilities. For instance, whereas
rule 2) expresses the policy of giving preference to new cus-
tomers, rule 3) performs an optimization task by using a tradeoff
heuristic for computing an adequate counter offer. The protocol
adopted by PANDA is simply a bilateral exchange of messages.
While either agent can start a bilateral negotiation, neither of
the two agents is required to alternate with sending messages.
Whereas this deviates from many of the negotiation mechanisms
which adopt the alternating offers protocol, it provides more
flexibility in allowing multiple messages from both provider
agents and consumer agents to be exchanged.
C. G-Negotiation Agents for Information Notification Service
Lawley et al. [34] investigated the use of negotiation agents
for identifying mutually acceptable terms among information
publishers (providers) and consumers of message notification
services in a Grid computing environment. Through negotia-
tion, an information publisher can balance between the utility
(satisfaction) of the consumers and its workload. Even though
in some cases, consumers’ utility may be lowered (e.g., receiv-
ing less frequent message updates), lowering its workload (e.g.,
sending message updates less frequently to a consumer) allows
a publisher to benefit from serving more consumers.
Adopting NDFs [30] [31] for a bilateral negotiation model,
Lawley et al.’s agents negotiate on terms such as frequency, for-
mat and accuracy of information being delivered by the notifica-
tion service. Whereas agents in Faratin et al. [30] adopt a range
Authorized licensed use limited to: Kwangju Institute of Science and Technology. Downloaded on April 20,2010 at 08:20:06 UTC from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
SIM: GRID RESOURCE NEGOTIATION: SURVEY AND NEW DIRECTIONS 249
of strategies based on time-dependent, resource-dependent, and
behavior-dependent NDFs, the strategies in Lawley et al. [34]
are determined using only a combination of both time-dependent
and resource-dependent NDFs. Time-dependent NDFs consist
of the Boulware, Linear, and Conceder tactics [30] [31] (details
are given in Section V-A) that determine the amount of con-
cession based on the fraction of remaining time (these will be
compared to the other negotiation mechanisms in Section V-A).
Using a resource function to determine the amount of re-
source consumption, resource-dependent NDFs consisting of
patient, steady, and impatient tactics generate proposals based
on how a particular resource (e.g., remaining bandwidth) is be-
ing consumed. Agents become more conciliatory as the quantity
of resource diminishes. By placing different weightings on the
time-dependent and resource-dependent NDFs, different strate-
gies can be composed. For instance, at the beginning of a nego-
tiation process, an agent may adopt a strategy that places more
weighting on resource-dependent NDFs but it can modify the
weighting as it reaches towards the deadline to exert more in-
fluence on time. Additionally, Lawley et al.’s agents negotiate
with one another following the alternating offers protocol.
D. Market-Driven and Relaxed-Criteria G-Negotiation
Based on a previous work on market-driven agents (MDAs)
[22], [35]–[40], Sim [41]–[44] presents a market-driven nego-
tiation mechanism for Grid resource management. The distin-
guishing features of the negotiation mechanism in [38]–[41]
include: 1) a market-driven strategy and 2) a relaxed-criteria
negotiation protocol.
1) Market-Driven Strategy: Using a market-driven strategy
[35]–[40], agents in [41]–[44] make adjustable amounts of con-
cession by considering factors such as outside options, market
rivalry, and time. An MDA determines the appropriate amount of
concession using a combination of three negotiation functions:
time (T) function, opportunity (O) function, and competition (C)
function. In an abstract MDA model [22], a linear combination
of all three functions is used to determine the overall concession.
For the purpose of experimentation, MDAs in [36], [41], [43],
and [44], respectively, used the product and the average of
the sum of the three functions for determining the overall
concession.
The T function models the intuition that as time passes,
an MDA relaxes its proposal by making attempt(s) to nar-
row the difference kt between its proposal and the counter-
proposal of its opponent in the current trading time t using
T (t, τ, λ) = 1− (t/τ)λ where τ is the deadline, and λ is an
MDA’s time preference. Whereas deadline puts negotiators un-
der pressure, they have different time preferences (e.g., negotia-
tors with different time preferences may have different conces-
sion rates with respect to time). With infinitely many values of
λ, there are infinitely many possible strategies in making con-
cessions with respect to remaining trading time. However, they
are classified in [22] and [36] as follows.
1) Linear: λ = 1 and kt+1 = [T(t,τ ,λ)]kt = [1−(t/τ )]kt . At
any round t, an MDA makes a constant rate of conces-
sion, ∆t = kt−kt+1 . At the deadline t = τ , kτ = [1−(τ–
1/τ )]kτ −1 and kτ +1 = [1−(τ /τ )]kτ = 0. Hence, ∆τ =
kτ−kτ +1 = kτ (an MDA expects and attempts to narrow
the difference completely at the deadline).
2) Conciliatory: kt+1 = [1−(t/τ )λ]kt , where 0 < λ<1. An
MDA makes larger concessions in the early trading rounds
and smaller concessions at the later stage.
3) Conservative: kt+1 = [1−(t/τ )λ]kt , where 1 < λ < ∞.
An MDA makes smaller concessions in early rounds and
larger concessions in later rounds.
In all the previous strategies, for all ∆t (including ∆τ ), there
is an additional constraint [22, p. 715] requiring that for a buyer
agent B (respectively, a seller agent S), lBt + ∆t ≤ RPB , where
RPB is B’s reserve price and lBt is B’s proposal at round t (re-
spectively, lSt −∆t ≥ RPS , where RPS is S’s reserve price and
lSt is S’s proposal at round t). If lBt + ∆t > RPB (respectively,
lSt −∆t < RPS ), then negotiation terminates with a conflict.
The O function determines the amount of concession based
on: 1) trading alternatives (i.e., outside options or number of
trading parties) and 2) differences in utilities generated by the
proposal of an MDA and the counterproposal(s) of its trading
party (parties). When determining opportunity, it was shown
in [35] and [36] that if there is a large number of trading alter-
natives, the likelihood that an agent proposes a bid/offer that is
potentially close to an MDA’s offer/bid may be high. However,
it would be difficult for the MDA to reach a consensus if none of
the so many options are viable (i.e., there are large differences
between the proposal of the MDA and the counterproposals of
all its trading parties). On this account, the O function deter-
mines the probability of reaching a consensus on its own terms
by determining its bargaining position based on: 1) trading al-
ternatives; 2) differences between its proposal and others; and
3) considering the probability of obtaining the worst possible
utility [45].
In a bilateral negotiation, the probability p of reaching consen-
sus on an agent’s own terms can be derived as follows. Suppose
agent B engages S1 in round t. B’s last proposal generates a pay-
off of vB→S1t for itself, and S1’s last counterproposal generates




t (i.e., vB→S1t is
more favorable for B). If B accepts S1’s counterproposal, it will
obtain wS1→Bt with certainty. If B insists on its last proposal, and
1) if S1 accepts it, B will obtain vB→S1t and 2) if S1 does not ac-
cept it, B may be subjected to a conflict utility cB . cB is the worst
possible utility for B, and wS1→Bt > cB . If S1 does not accept B’s
last proposal, B may ultimately have to settle with lower utilities
(the lowest possible being cB ), if there are changes in the market
situations in subsequent cycles. For instance, B may face more
competition in subsequent cycles, and may have to ultimately
accept a utility that is lower than wS1→Bt (possibly as low as
cB if the negotiation ends in disagreement). Let the subjective
probability of B obtaining cB be pc (conflict probability) and
the probability that B achieves vB→S1t is 1−pc , then, based on
Zeuthen’s analysis [46], if B insists on holding its last proposal, B
will obtain an expected payoff of (1− pc)× vB→S1t + pc × cB .
Hence, B will find that it is advantageous to insist on its
last proposal only if [(1− pc)× vB→S1t + pc × cB ] ≥ wS1→Bt .
Thus, pc ≤ (vB→S1t − wS1→Bt )/(vB→S1t − cB ). Consequently,
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the maximum value of pc is the highest probability of a conflict





where pc is a ratio of difference between two utilities. While
vB→S1t − wS1→Bt measures the cost of accepting the trad-
ing agent’s last offer (the spread k or difference between the
(counter-)proposals of B and S1), vB→S1t − cB measures the
cost of provoking a conflict.
In a multilateral negotiation, if B has n trading parties, the
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Consequently, the probability that B will obtain a utility
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The C function determines the amount of competition of
an MDA by determining the probability that it is not being
considered as the most preferred trading party. Since MDAs are
utility maximizing agents, an MDA is more likely to reach a
consensus if its proposal is ranked the highest by some other
agent. Suppose an agent B has m–1 competitors {B2 , . . ., Bm}
and n trading parties {S1 , . . ., Sn}. The probability that B is
not the most preferred trading party of any Sj (where Sj ∈
{S1 ,. . ., Sn}) is (m–1)/m. In this model, a uniform distribution
[22, p. 714] is assumed. Furthermore, it is also assumed that
agents do not form coalitions [22, p. 723]. Hence, the probability
that B is not the most preferred party of all Sj ∈ {S1 , . . ., Sn} is
[(m− 1)/m]n . In general, the probability that B is considered
the most preferred trading party by at least one of Sj ∈ {S1 ,
. . ., Sn} is: C(m,n) = 1− [(m− 1)/m]n , where m and n are,
respectively, the numbers of buyer agents (including B) and
seller agents at round t.
Additionally, Sim [22] has proven that MDAs negotiate opti-
mally by making minimally sufficient concessions with respect
to opportunity and competition (see [22, Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2,
pp. 718–719]).
2) Relaxed-Criteria Protocol: The G-negotiation protocol
used in [41]–[44] enhances the alternating offers protocol by
slightly relaxing the criteria for agents to reach a consensus
using the following rules:
R1: An agreement is reached if two agents B1 and S1 propose
deals b1 and o1 , respectively, such that either 1) U(b1)≥ U(o1)
or 2) U(o1)≥U(b1), where U is a utility function mapping b1
and o1 to [0,1].
R2: An agreement is reached if either 1) η = U(o1)–U(b1),
such that η→0 or 2) η = U(b1)–U(o1), such that η→0, where
η is the amount of relaxation determined using a fuzzy decision
controller (FDC).
In the alternating offers protocol and also in most negotiation
models (e.g., [28], [34], [47], only to name a few because of
space limitation), a pair of negotiation agents (B1 , S1) reaches
an agreement when one agent proposes a deal that matches (or
exceeds) what another agent asks for (see R1). R1 was relaxed
in [41]–[44] where a G-negotiation agent also accepts another
agent’s (counter-)proposal if it is sufficiently close to its own
proposal following R2.
In Sim’s relaxed-criteria bargaining protocol [43], [44], G-
negotiation agents representing resource providers and con-
sumers are programmed to slightly relax their bargaining cri-
teria under intense pressure (e.g., when a consumer has a higher
demand for resources) in the hope of enhancing their chance
of successfully acquiring resources. A consumer agent and a
provider agent are both designed with an FDC: FDC-C and
FDC-P, respectively. Two sets of relaxation criteria (for con-
sumers and providers, respectively) that are specific to Grid
resource management are used as inputs to FDC-C and FDC-P,
respectively.
a) Consumers’ relaxation criteria: Two criteria that can in-
fluence a consumer agent’s decision in the amount of relaxation
of bargaining terms are: 1) recent statistics in failing/succeeding
in acquiring resources called failure to success ratio (fst), and
2) demand for computing resources called demand factor (dft).
If a consumer agent is less successful in acquiring resources re-
cently to execute its set of tasks, it will be under more pressure
to slightly relax its bargaining criteria in the hope of completing
a deal. Furthermore, if it has a greater demand for computing
resources it is more likely to be under more pressure to slightly
relax its bargaining criteria. Both fst and dft are inputs to FDC-
C, which a consumer agent uses to determine η (its amount of
relaxation) [43], [44].
b) Providers’ relaxation criteria: Two criteria that can in-
fluence a provider agent’s decision are: 1) the amount of the
provider’s resource(s) being utilized [i.e., the utilization level
(ult)], and 2) recent requests from consumers for resources [i.e.,
called the request factor (rft)]. If more of its resources are cur-
rently being used to execute its own tasks or are already leased
to other consumers, then a provider is less likely to slightly re-
lax its bargaining terms. If there are fewer recent demands from
consumers to lease its resources, a provider is more likely to
slightly relax its bargaining criteria since it is under more pres-
sure to trade its idle resources. Both ult and rft are inputs to
FDC-P, which a provider agent uses to determine η [43], [44].
Empirical results obtained in [41], [43], and [44] show that
by slightly relaxing their bargaining terms under intense nego-
tiation pressure, both consumer and provider agents generally
achieved higher success rates in negotiation (without sacrificing
much of their average utilities).
E. G-Negotiation Agents for Mobile Grid
Ghosh et al. [47], [48] considered the issue of load balancing
in a mobile computational Grid by proposing a fair pricing strat-
egy and an optimal static job allocation scheme. In their model,
a mobile Grid computing system consists of mobile devices that
are sellers of resources, and wireless access point (WAP) servers
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Fig. 1. Bargaining game of alternating offers.
that bargain with mobile devices to purchase resources for pro-
viding services to a community of Grid resource consumers.
The bargaining between a WAP server and a mobile device is
modeled as a two-player noncooperative bargaining game of
incomplete information. If there are n mobile devices under
a single WAP server, the WAP server will compose a price per
unit resource vector (p1 ,. . .,pn ) by playing n such games with all
n corresponding mobile devices. The pricing strategy adopted
in [47], [48], considers factors such as resource constraints, time
discount factor, “market price,” the expected counterproposal
of an agent’s opponent, and the perceived probabilities that an
agent’s opponent will: 1) accept its proposal; 2) reject its pro-
posal but negotiation will continue as the opponent will make
a counterproposal; and 3) reject its proposal and negotiation
breaks down (i.e., terminates without an agreement). Let Ox be
the price proposed by a bargainer x. Let POxx (acc), POxx (rco),
and POxx (rbd) be the perceived probabilities that x’s opponent
will: 1) accept its offer (acc); 2) reject its offer and make a
counteroffer (rco); and 3) reject its offer and bargaining breaks
down (rbd). Ghosh et al. model a bargaining game of alternating
offers as shown in Fig. 1. At each node in Fig. 1, there are three
possible outcomes and each is associated with one of the three
perceived probabilities listed above.
Intuitively, resource constraints prescribe that negotiation
should break down if a mobile device does not have sufficient
resources to offer. Time discount factor models the devalua-
tion of a resource with the passage of time. In [47] and [48],
“market price” refers to the “market value” of a resource deter-
mined based on the history of recent bargaining games that a
WAP server and a mobile device have participated in. An agent
attempts to predict the expected counterproposal of its oppo-
nent by making “intelligent guesses” of its opponent’s reserve
valuation. Like many existing bargaining models, bargaining
between a pair of a WAP server and a mobile device is carried
out following the alternating offers protocol.
Fig. 2. State transitions of the SNAP protocol [49].
F. Service Negotiation and Acquisition Protocol
In addition to the bargaining and pricing strategies for Grid
resource and service management described above, there are
also negotiation protocols that are used for match-making and
reservations that do not specifically consider the economics of
resource management. For example, SNAP has been proposed
by Czajkowski et al. [16], [49], [50] for advance resource reser-
vation and is utilized in a Grid computing platform. In SNAP,
Grid participants negotiate a service-level agreement (SLA) in
which a resource provider establishes a contract with a client
or consumer to provide some measurable capabilities or to per-
form a task. Given that establishing a single SLA across a set
of (simultaneously required) resources that may be owned and
operated by different providers is very difficult, SNAP defines a
resource management model in which: 1) consumers or clients
can submit tasks to be performed, and 2) get promises of ca-
pability (commitment from the providers or servers), and bind
1) and 2). In SNAP, SLAs are classified into: Resource SLAs
(RSLAs), Task SLAs (TSLAs), and Binding SLAs (BSLAs). In an
RSLA, clients negotiate with resource providers for the rights to
consume a resource without specifying how the resource will be
utilized. For example, an advance resource reservation takes the
form of an RSLA, and it characterizes a resource in terms of its
abstract service capabilities. In a TSLA, clients negotiate with re-
source providers for the performance of an activity or a task. For
example, a TSLA is created by submitting a job description to a
queuing system and it characterizes a task in terms of its service
steps and resource requirements. In a BSLA, clients negotiate
with resource providers for the application of a resource to a
task. A BSLA associates a task defined by a TSLA to an RSLA.
In the SNAP protocol, there are four states in resource plan-
ning: S0 , S1 , S2 , and S3 (see Fig. 2). Note that in Fig. 2, a
solid arrow represents a request (or action) by a client, and
a dashed arrow represents an action or internal behavior of a
resource provider. In S0 , SLAs have not been created or have
been resolved by termination or cancellation of the SLAs. In S1 ,
both RSLAs and TSLAs have been agreed upon, but they are not
matched with each other. The solid arrow from S0 to S1 (see
Fig. 2) represents the transition of a client that has successfully
negotiated with resource providers to establish both RSLAs and
TSLAs. There are three possible movements from S1 : 1) S1 to
S0 (dashed arrow); 2) S1 to S1 (solid curly arrow); and 3) S1
to S2 (solid arrow). S1 to S0 represents the transition in which
SLAs have been either cancelled by a resource provider or a
client, or expired. S1 to S1 represents the transition in which
a client is waiting to establish the BSLAs (even though it has
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TABLE I
SUMMARY AND COMPARISON
already established both RSLAs and TSLAs). S1 to S2 represents
the transition of a client that has successfully negotiated with
resource providers for the application of resources to tasks (i.e.,
successfully establishing BSLAs). In S2 , the TSLA is matched
with the RSLA, and this binding represents a dependent BSLA to
resolve the task. There are three possible movements from S2 :
1) S2 to S1 (dashed arrow); 2) S2 to S2 (solid curly arrow); and
3) S2 to S3 (dashed arrow). S2 to S1 represents the transition in
which a resource provider moves the control back to the prior
state because some fault has occurred and the task cannot be
scheduled. S2 to S2 represents the transition that even though a
BSLA has been established, a client is waiting for the task to be
scheduled. S2 to S3 represents the scheduling of resources by a
resource provider to satisfy a TSLA. In S3 , although resources
are actively being utilized to support a task, they can still be con-
trolled and changed (e.g., moving back to S2 from S3). Whereas
the movement from S3 to S3 represents the transition of task
execution (a client’s task is being executed and it is waiting
for the task to complete execution), S3 to S2 represents either
task completion or faults in the execution so that the resource
provider moves the control back to the prior state.
V. COMPARISONS
This section provides comparisons of G-negotiation mech-
anisms reviewed in Section IV in terms of the approaches
adopted for: 1) modeling devaluation of resources with pass-
ing time (see Section V-A); 2) considering market factors in
the concession making strategies (see Section V-B); 3) relax-
ing bargaining terms and exploring mutual gains (see Sec-
tion V-C); and 4) resource co-allocation (see Section V-D).
Table I summarizes and compares the main features of the
works reviewed in Section IV in terms of their negotiation pro-
tocol, negotiation strategies, and coordination. It can be seen in
Table I that only SNAP [16], [49], [50] considered the is-
sue of coordinating resource utilization by finding solutions to
satisfy multiple resource requirements. However, Czajkowski
et al. [16], [49], [50] did not consider the issues of specify-
ing the negotiation protocols and strategies to enable agents to
search for more flexible or perhaps near optimal allocation. On
the other hand, coordination of resources was not considered
in [34], [41], [43], [44], [47], and [48]. The negotiation models
in [34], [41], [43], [44], [47], and [48] can only be adopted for
allocation of a single Grid resource.
A. Modeling Time Discounting
Lang [29], Lawley et al. [34], Sim [41], Sim and Ng [43], [44],
and Ghosh et al. [47], [48] incorporated a time discount factor
in their concession making strategies to model devaluation of
resources with passing time. Whereas Lang [29] adopted vari-
ants of the time-dependent NDFs ([30], [31]), Lawley et al.
[34] used a combination of time-dependent and resource-
dependent NDFs. The time function in [47] and [48] is dif-
ferent from [29], [34], [41], [43], and [44]; however, this section
only focuses on comparing the time functions in [29], [34],
[41], [43], and [44]. Table II compares the time-dependent
functions in [29], [34], [41], [43], and [44] in terms of three
major classes of concession making strategies. It serves to high-
light the common features of the three different time functions
in [29], [34], [41], [43], and [44]. By showing the similarities
of these time functions, Table II provides designers with some
guidelines on the common properties of the mathematical func-
tions for modeling devaluation of resources. For instance, all
functions in [29], [34], [41], [43], and [44] can be used to model
1) concessions made with respect to time, and 2) different at-
titudes of agents toward time [e.g., a patient (respectively, an
impatient) agent can adopt either the Boulware or the conser-
vative or the aggressive strategy (respectively, the Conceder or
the conciliatory or the defensive strategy)].
B. Modeling Market Dynamics
To model market dynamics in their concession making strate-
gies, Lang [29], Sim [41], [42], and Sim and Ng [43], [44] and
Ghosh et al. [47], [48] take into consideration factors such as
opportunity, probability of an opponent accepting a bargainer’s
offer, competition, and “market power.” Table III compares the
opportunity and competition functions of [29], [41]–[44], [47],
[48] in terms of making less (respectively, more) concessions
in favorable (respectively, unfavorable) market conditions. It
serves to show the similar concession making properties of the
opportunity functions in [41], [43], [44], [47], and [48] and the
competition functions in [41], [43], [44], and [29]. By showing
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the similarities of these opportunity and competition functions,
this section provides designers with some guidelines on their
common properties for modeling market conditions.
C. Relaxing Bargaining Terms and Mutual Gains
While Sections V-A and V-B analyze various G-negotiation
mechanisms in terms of their concession making strategies, this
section compares the protocol of G-negotiation mechanisms
based on issues such as: 1) exploring joint gains in utility, and
2) relaxing bargaining terms to enhance success rates.
The bargaining protocol in [29] not only focuses on opti-
mizing the utility of an individual agent, but also attempts to
increase the mutual gains of all agents. In the integrative phase
of its two-phase protocol, agents make small adjustments to their
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preliminary agreement in the distributive phase in the hope of
improving joint gains. On this account, in addition to optimiz-
ing individual utility, the protocol of [29] also considers other
factors such as finding a Pareto-efficient solution.
The rule sets in PANDA [33] express policies that consider
customer satisfaction and business reputation rather than just
profitability and maximizing utilities. For instance, PANDA can
express a policy such as “if the customer’s offer is close to an
agent’s proposal, and if the customer is new, then accept the
offer” using a rule such as “if LEVEL_OF_DISSENT < 0.05
and NEW_CUSTOMER then ACCEPT.” In [41]–[44], while
the market-driven strategy attempts to optimize utilities, the
relaxed-criteria protocol uses a set of fuzzy rules to guide MDAs
in making decisions to slightly relax their bargaining terms.
Whereas MDAs use fuzzy rules to determine the amount of relax-
ation based on statistics of recent resource demands and recent
success-failure rates (for consumer), and amount of resource
being utilized and statistics of requests (for provider), PANDA
slightly relaxes its bargaining terms based on business policies
such as giving preferences to new customers. By slightly relax-
ing bargaining terms, the negotiation success rate of an agent
can be enhanced [43], [44], even though in some situations this
may be done at the expense of achieving slightly lower utility
(i.e., utilizing a slightly more expensive resource). However,
in a Grid computing environment, being (more) successful in
negotiating for access to computing resources is essential for
avoiding any possible delay overhead incurred on waiting for a
resource assignment.
In summary, agents in [29], [33], and [41]–[44] are designed
to make small modifications to their bargaining proposals in
the hope of finding a more Pareto-efficient outcome in the
case of [29], enhancing bargaining success rates in the case
of [41]–[44], and improving customer satisfaction/relation in the
case of [33]. The negotiation models in [29],[33] and [41]–[44]
are examples of (Grid-)negotiation mechanisms that not only
focus on determining the value (price) of Grid resources, but
also consider social factors (e.g., inter-business relationships),
successful negotiation outcomes, and Pareto-efficiency.
D. Co-Allocation, Concurrent Negotiations, and Coordination
Supporting Grid resource co-allocation involves: 1) bolster-
ing multiple concurrent pairs of negotiations simultaneously,
and 2) coordinating the concurrent negotiations. Even though
the alternating offers protocol has been widely adopted in many
bargaining mechanisms for generic e-commerce applications
in which a buyer typically negotiates with a seller on a single
product/service at one time, it may not be adequate for speci-
fying the procedures that a negotiation agent in Grid resource
management will follow when it has to negotiate for multiple
resources simultaneously with several other agents. Among
the G-negotiation mechanisms discussed in Section IV, either
the alternating offers protocol or its variant (e.g., with relaxed
criteria for reaching a consensus [43], [44] or a two-phase (dis-
tributive and integrative) negotiation protocol [29]) is adopted
in [29], [34], [41]–[44], [47], and [48] . However, very often
Grid applications running intensive applications may require
several (types of) resources simultaneously, and these resources
may be owned by different resource owners. Even though it may
be possible for a consumer to adopt a concurrent bilateral (or
multilateral) negotiation model (with several agents negotiating
concurrently with multiple resource providers for several (types
of) resources simultaneously) following the alternating offers
protocol, the G-negotiation mechanisms in [29], [34], [41]–[44],
[47], [48] were not specifically designed to support coordination
among different resource providers. Hence, even if a consumer
can successfully acquire all required resources through negotia-
tion, the issue of coordinating the utilization of these resources
that are owned by different owners still needs to be resolved. The
SNAP protocol focuses on negotiating for multiple (simultane-
ous) access of resources through advance resource reservation,
establishment of service level agreements, and RSLAs and
TSLAs bindings (see Section IV-F). Using the SNAP protocol, a
consumer may achieve advance resource reservation and coor-
dinate simultaneous access to multiple resources following the
four states in resource planning shown in Fig. 2 (see description
in Section IV-F). However, unlike [29], [34], [41]–[44], [47],
and [48], where strategies for optimizing utilities of Grid par-
ticipants were considered, SNAP [16], [49], [50] only searches
for the solutions for satisfying the resource requirements of
Grid consumers, and does not focus on optimizing the return
on investment and purchasing price of Grid participants.
VI. SUMMARY OF CONTRIBUTIONS
Whereas a preliminary short survey of bargaining models
for Grid resource allocation by Sim [51] was published as a
short newsletter, this paper has significantly and considerably
extended and expanded [51] by providing a more detailed review
(see Section IV) and very detailed comparisons of the various
state-of-the-art G-negotiation models (see Section V). Addition-
ally, considerably much more detailed discussions are provided
in Sections II and III describing both the motivations for con-
sidering bargaining as a mechanism for Grid resource alloca-
tion and the essential considerations for designing G-negotiation
mechanisms.
Complementing Existing Surveys: Whereas [3] provided a
classification of Grid resource management systems, [5], [6]
surveyed economic models (in general) for Grid resource man-
agement, focusing mainly on auction, commodity market and
contract net models. To this end, this survey that focuses on
Grid bargaining mechanisms does not compete with related sur-
veys on Grid resource management, but rather it complements
and supplements existing surveys on economic models for Grid
resource management. The contributions of this survey are: 1)
identifying and describing the essential design issues for build-
ing negotiation mechanisms; 2) providing agent designers with
a repertoire of time-dependent and market-driven functions for
formulating negotiation strategies; and 3) suggesting new re-
search directions in G-negotiations.
Identifying Issues in G-negotiation: While [52] provided
guiding principles and described desirable properties of generic
automated negotiation systems, and [53] surveyed state-of-the-
art negotiation agents for e-commerce, this work identifies and
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describes the essential design issues for building negotiation
mechanisms specific to Grid resource management. In general,
negotiation mechanisms can be evaluated according to many
types of criteria, and the choice of protocol will depend on the
properties the designer wants the overall system to have [54].
Some of the desirable properties of negotiation mechanisms
prescribed in [32], [52], [54] include: guaranteed success (en-
suring that agreements are reached), searching Pareto-efficient
outcomes (see Section IV-A), and being stable. A negotiation
mechanism is stable if it provides all agents with an incentive
to behave in a desired manner (e.g., they have no incentive
to deviate from their chosen strategies [52, p. 21]). In some
situations, it is possible to design negotiation mechanisms with
dominant strategies [54], i.e., an agent has the best-response
strategy no matter what strategies other agents adopt. Among
the works reviewed in Section IV, the market-driven negotia-
tion mechanism in [41] and [42] is stable because it was proven
in [22] and [40] that conservative strategies (see Section IV-D)
are dominant strategies for MDAs in [41] and [42]. The negoti-
ation mechanisms in [29] and [34] (which adopt the negotiation
model in [30]) are also stable because it was proven in [31] that
Boulware strategies (see Sections IV-A and IV-C) are dominant
strategies for the negotiation model in [30]. In Section IV-A,
it was noted that the work in [29] has an integrative negotia-
tion phase for agents to improve their joint outcome by making
minor adjustments to the preliminary agreement in the distribu-
tive negotiation phase which may be below Pareto efficiency.
The negotiation mechanism in [41] and [44] enhances the ne-
gotiation success rates of MDAs by adopting a relaxed-criteria
G-negotiation protocol.
Guidelines for Designers: Another contribution of this sur-
vey is identifying some common properties of the negotiation
decision functions used in different G-negotiation mechanisms.
By explicitly highlighting some of the similar characteristics
(i.e., slow (respectively, constant, and fast) decreasing conces-
sion patterns, and making less (respectively, more) concessions
in favorable (respectively, unfavorable) markets) of the different
negotiation decision functions used in the works surveyed in this
paper, Tables II and III in this survey aim at providing agent de-
signers with a repertoire of time-dependent and market-driven
functions for formulating negotiation strategies of agents.
Deployment to Grids: It is noted that a resource broker adopt-
ing the SNAP protocol [16], [49], [50] was deployed and tested
in the White Rose Grid [57]. The time and opportunity functions
in [41], [43], and [44] were adopted in the negotiation strate-
gies in [58] for Grid scheduling using workload traces from the
Cornell Theory Center that had 512 CPU nodes.
VII. CONCLUSION AND NEW DIRECTIONS
The G-negotiation mechanisms discussed in Section IV ad-
dress only some of the issues mentioned in Section III (see
Table I). This section suggests possible new directions by ad-
dressing some of the partially addressed or unaddressed issues
described as follows.
Predicting market dynamics: Whereas [33] and [34] con-
sidered bilateral bargaining models for services management,
bargaining models in [29], [41]–[44], [47], and [48] take into
consideration the influence of market factors. As detailed in
Section V-B, an agent’s “market power” in [29] generally cor-
responds to the C function in MDAs. However, [29] did not
model the notion of opportunity. Even though market dynam-
ics were not explicitly modeled in [47] and [48], the “market
value” of a resource is determined using the history of recent
bargaining. Whereas the notion of the probability that the op-
ponent will accept an agent’s offer bears some resemblance to
an MDA’s O function, there is no explicit modeling of market
rivalry and outside options. Nevertheless, in its present form,
MDAs only react to current market situations by considering the
O and C functions, they do not have any mechanisms for predict-
ing market dynamics (e.g., future outside options). Given that
Grid nodes may join and leave the Grid at any time, modeling
future uncertainties of possible outside options (e.g., predicting
changing number of resource alternatives) in a Grid market may
be a topic for future research.
Optimal relaxation: Whereas relaxing bargaining terms
slightly (at the expense of achieving slightly lower utility) may
be desirable to enhance the success rates of acquiring computing
resources, the problem of determining the appropriate amount
of relaxation to achieve both optimal utilities and optimal suc-
cess rates under different market conditions (e.g., given different
resource alternatives and demands) and constraints (e.g., given
different deadlines) remains open. This problem may involve
devising learning techniques for tuning the set of fuzzy rules for
optimal relaxation.
Mechanism for coordination and negotiation: Finally, as men-
tioned in Section IV-F, whereas SNAP finds solutions to sat-
isfy multiple resource requirements of consumers, it does not
consider the issue of optimizing utility as given in [29], [34],
[41]–[44], [47], and [48], but the protocols given in [29], [34],
[41]–[44], [47], and [48] do not address the issue of coordi-
nating resource utilization. This paper suggests that both: 1)
satisfying requirements of Grid consumers to access multiple
resources simultaneously, and 2) considering the economics
of resource allocation mechanisms, are essential. The selec-
tion of a server/provider for a task is not only a question of
mapping job description to resource availability, but should
also take into consideration the conditions about price, per-
formance, and quality of service of the server. To the best of
the author’s knowledge, to date, there is no bargaining mech-
anism that: 1) adopts a negotiation protocol that is similar to
SNAP; 2) adopts a negotiation strategy that optimizes utilities;
and 3) considers the issues of Grid market dynamics and re-
laxing bargaining terms. It is envisioned that future work on
bargaining models for Grid resource management will con-
sider issues 1)–3) as well as others. One of the possible ap-
proaches for constructing a negotiation mechanism for Grid re-
source co-allocation is to incorporate the detailed specifications
of the negotiation activities between consumers and providers
into a SNAP-like coordination protocol by taking into consid-
eration the issues of enhancing negotiation success rates by
relaxing bargaining criteria, optimizing utility, and modeling
market dynamics. Details of such a mechanism are presented
in [55].
Authorized licensed use limited to: Kwangju Institute of Science and Technology. Downloaded on April 20,2010 at 08:20:06 UTC from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
256 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYSTEMS, MAN, AND CYBERNETICS—PART C: APPLICATIONS AND REVIEWS, VOL. 40, NO. 3, MAY 2010
Third-party mediation: In addition to the works reviewed in
Section IV, it is noted that [56] also considered a G-negotiation
mechanism by adopting genetic algorithm (GA) for evolving
agents’ strategies by exploring the possible agreement space
and employed a trusted third party protocol (TTP) to find an
optimized point in the agreement space. By employing a negoti-
ation protocol that combines GA and TTP, a mutually beneficial
agreement point can be reached. Since the negotiation mech-
anism in [56] was designed for bilateral negotiations using a
trusted third party, the issue of market dynamics was not con-
sidered. Even though the pricing mechanism considered factors
such as peak periods, normal periods, discount periods, and
waiting time, the devaluation of resources with time was not ex-
plicitly modeled. Additionally, the issues of relaxing bargaining
terms and resource co-allocation were not considered. In partic-
ular, [56] differs significantly from the negotiation mechanisms
discussed in Section IV because it involves mediations from a
trusted third party, which is outside the scope of the issues con-
sidered in this paper. Hence, inclusion of a detailed comparison
between [56] and the negotiation mechanisms in Section IV is
not appropriate.
Concluding remark: Most the works surveyed in this pa-
per [29], [33], [34], [41], [43], [44], [47], [48] address the
issues of modeling devaluation of resources and market dy-
namics, and the issue of relaxing bargaining terms is addressed
in [33], [41], [43], and [44]. However, these works only consid-
ered negotiation for a single Grid resource and did not address
the issue of coordinating multiple Grid resources. This paper
suggests that a negotiation mechanism for supporting the al-
location of multiple Grid resources will likely be constructed
by incorporating some of the negotiation strategies and pro-
tocols in [29], [33], [34], [41], [43], [44], [47], and [48] into
SNAP’s coordination protocol. It is hoped that this survey will
not only provide the foundation for understanding Grid bargain-
ing mechanisms, but will also inspire other researchers to take
up the challenge to investigate some of the issues raised here as
well as other problems relating to Grid resource negotiation.
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